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Saffer v. Willoughby*
In 1978, the New Jersey Supreme Court created a system whereby
clients could elect to arbitrate any fee disputes with their attorneys.1 This
system was designed solely to cover issues relating to fee disputes; it was
never intended to handle legal malpractice claims. This interplay between
fee disputes arbitration and malpractice was the subject of Saffer v.
Willoughby, a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case.
It should be of no surprise that attorney malpractice and fee disputes are
often found lurking in the same lair. In both malpractice and fee disputes,
the client believes that he did not get what he paid for.2 Attorneys probably
suspect that at some time during a fee dispute, the client will entertain the
possibility that his attorney committed malpractice.
3
How should the relationship between fee disputes and malpractice be
reflected in procedural rules governing attorney fee arbitration? As
demonstrated in Saffer v. Willoughby, this issue becomes important when
clients file separate actions for malpractice and for a fee dispute. When one
of the actions is filed in court and one before an arbitral Fee Committee, the
relationship between the two bodies and their overlapping jurisdiction can
affect the remedies available to the client.4
* 670 A.2d 527 (NJ. 1996).
I Although fee arbitration is voluntary for the client, the attorney must participate in fee
arbitration if the client so elects. For further discussion of this process, see In the Matter of
the Application of Philip J. Livolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (NJ. 1981).
2 See generally Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of
ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005 (1993).
3 A malpractice claim may precede or follow a fee dispute. For example, receiving the
attorney's bill may be the "last straw" which causes the client to file a malpractice action
regarding an unsatisfactory result in his case. Or the client may first be shocked by the
amount of the bill, file a fee dispute, then as facts to substantiate the fee dispute are
discovered, the client may later find reasons to believe that the attorney did not perform
competently and file a malpractice action. See Rau, supra note 2, at 2005-2006.
4 Issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata could also be present when a client files
separate actions for malpractice and for a fee dispute. For a brief discussion of these issues,
see Rau, supra note 2, at 2048-2050.
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A client with a fee dispute may perceive his attorney as having
committed malpractice5 regardless of whether there is a colorable claim. In
reality, a fee dispute may or may not involve incompetent lawyering. On
the one hand, the attorney and the client may disagree solely about the basis
of the fee. Or the client may intuitively believe that the amount of the bill
should always be proportionate to the success of his case. In such cases,
malpractice is not part of a fee dispute.
On the other hand, some fee disputes inherently involve malpractice
and the violation of one of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). For
example, if a client believes the attorney's bill is excessive because the
attorney billed for what he did not do ("bill padding"), clearly the
underlying cause of the fee dispute is malpractice and involves a violation of
an RPC.
In New Jersey, fee arbitration was instituted to provide a less
cumbersome alternative to clients with claims against their attorneys. 6 Both
attorneys and clients benefit from fee arbitration by avoiding publicity and
legal fees. Attorneys get the additional benefit of not having clients
complain about the attorney's services in open court.
Saffer v. Willoughby illustrates the inherent difficulties encountered in a
fee arbitration system when a disgruntled client also alleges malpractice.
The Saffer court had to determine how New Jersey's system of fee
arbitration should operate in order to ensure fairness to the client, the
attorney and the members of the arbitral Fee Committee. In the process of
deciding this issue, the court needed to define the jurisdiction of the Fee
Committee when a malpractice complaint is filed.
In Saffer, William W. Willoughby, Jr., the disgruntled client, refused
to pay the fees of Mr. Saffer, the attorney.7 Subsequently, the attorney filed
a request for fee arbitration. After the arbitration began, the client's new
attorney discovered evidence that the first attorney had committed
5 Legal malpractice "[c]onsists of failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in
performance of tasks which they undertake, and when such failure proximately causes damage
it gives rise to an action in tort." BLACKS'S LAW DIcTIONARY 662 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
6 See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
7 Mr. willoughby was a professional basketball player and had hired Mr. Saffer to bring
suit against his former agent, Jerry Davis. Although Mr. Saffer filed a counterclaim against
Mr. Davis, Mr. Saffer failed to implead Lewis Scheffel, Mr. Willoughby's former business
manager. After a verdict for Mr. Willoughby, Mr. Davis filed for bankruptcy, allowing Mr.
Willoughby to collect only $150,000 of a $750,047.84 judgment. (Although the jury
originally awarded $768,047.84, the Appellate Division reduced the award to $750,957.78.)
See Saffer, 670 A.2d at 529-531.
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malpractice.3 In addition to submitting evidence of the alleged malpractice
at the arbitration, Mr. Willoughby's new attorney filed a legal malpractice
complaint.
The New Jersey Fee Arbitration Committee ruled that the first attorney
had met his burden per Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct9 and
was entitled to his fee. 10 The Law Division confirmed the award, which was
later affirmed by the Appellate Division. The court ruled that under New
Jersey law a pending malpractice action was not a valid reason to vacate an
arbitration award.1 1 Mr. Willoughby appealed to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.
The first and second issues for the Saffer court were jurisdictional:
(1) whether the Fee Committee had jurisdiction to decide a legal
malpractice claim; and (2) whether the arbitral Fee Committee should be
deprived of jurisdiction to decide afee dispute when, after arbitration had
already begun, a legal malpractice action was filed.
Regarding to the first question, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that New Jersey's Arbitration Rules did not allow the Fee Committee to
take jurisdiction over legal malpractice cases. 12 The Saffer court explained
that the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Fee Committee was very narrowly
limited to fee disputes, for two important reasons. First, the limited
jurisdiction allowed the committee to process disputes in a timely manner.
13
Second, because the Committee's decisions are almost unappealable,' 4 the
a Because Mr. Saffer had refused to implead Lewis Scheffel, Mr. Willoughby's new
attorney alleged that Mr. Safrer had negligently or intentionally precluded Mr. Willoughby
from trying to collect a larger portion of the $750,957.78 award. Mr. Willoughby's new
attorney filed a legal malpractice complaint in May of 1993. See id. at 529-530.
9 Under the ABA Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, the attorney has the burden of
proving the reasonableness of his fee according to eight specific factors. See id. at 530.
10 $103,510 of the S120,000 fee awarded remained unpaid. See id.
11 See id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (West 1987)).
12 The court based its ruling on the court-established rules for the Fee Committee.
Under those rules, the Fee Committee must refuse to hear a case "in which the primary issues
in dispute raise substantial legal questions in addition to the basic fee disputes. . . ." rd. at
531 (quoting NJ. R. CT. 1:20A-2(b)(3)).
13 "Fee Committees are primarily created to render fair and fast decisions. They are not
designed to hear two-week long cases where the client's defense to a $40,000 fee is that the
lawyer is guilty of malpractice, a substantial legal issue." Id. at 531-532 (quoting Office of
Attorney Ethics of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, District Fee Arbitration Committee
Manual for Committees Appointed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey 26 (1993)).
14 An important question for the legislature is whether the decisions of arbitral fee
committees should be appealable. If such decisions were appealable, then courts could allow
the committee to hear malpractice cases as well. This would save judicial resources because
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malpractice plaintiff might not be able to get reconsideration of his claim.
The court saw this as unfair in a legal malpractice claim and thus held that
the Fee Committee did not have jurisdiction over legal malpractice claims.
In answering the second jurisdictional question, the court held that the
Fee Committee retained jurisdiction over the fee dispute when the
malpractice suit was filed. Thus, the Saffer court protected the jurisdiction
of the Fee Committee and prevented the volunteer Fee Committee members
from wasting their time and efforts by preparing a case, only to have a
client find evidence of malpractice days before the arbitration and take the
case from the arbitral committee.
The final holding of the court was that, even though Mr. Willoughby
had continued in arbitration after filing the malpractice claim, the court
could stay the arbitration award pending the outcome of the malpractice case
in court. In future actions, if a client discovered evidence of malpractice,
the client would have a new thirty-day window during which he may
withdraw his request for arbitration. Is
From the client's point of view, the court's decision applies common
sense. If an attorney has committed malpractice, the client should not have
to pay for the attorney's services until it is determined that he did not
commit malpractice, regardless of whether arbitration has begun. After all,
as the Saffer court discussed, fee arbitration is to provide a "swift, fair and
inexpensive method of resolving fee disputes." 16 Making a client pay an
arbitral award for services which may later be found to have been performed
incompetently would subvert the good will intended by creating the arbitral
forum.
To attorneys, however, allowing clients to withdraw from fee
arbitration is giving clients "two bites at the apple." Clients may be tempted
to request fee arbitration to delay paying the attorney. Then, if the
arbitration does not proceed to his satisfaction, the client can reveal
evidence of legal malpractice previously withheld and get a new thirty-day
window to withdraw the request. Although this scenario presupposes the
client's willingness to deceive the arbitration panel and the court, the
scenario may make such deceit temptingly tailored for the dishonest client.
Also, as discussed by the Saffer court, allowing clients to withdraw from
arbitration would potentially waste the time and efforts of a fee
committee.
17
many of the issues of malpractice and fee disputes are intertwined.
15 See 670 A.2d at 532-533.
16 1d. at 531 (quoting In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1281 (NJ. 1981)) (emphasis
added).
17 New Jersey's Fee Arbitration Rules originally provided that a client could withdraw
from fee arbitration up until the arbitration actually began. The 1995 amendment provides that
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Although the Saffer court is probably correct to protect the client from
having to pay the fee before a malpractice action is decided, some protection
is needed to ensure that a client is not filing for fee arbitration in order to
delay paying the attorney. The New Jersey Supreme Court should amend
the rules governing fee arbitration so that clients must bear the burden of
proving their good faith in applying for fee arbitration. To help guide
clients through the process of choosing a forum and ensure that burdensome
hurdles do not take away the benefits conferred by fee arbitration, fee
committees could provide a screening service to clients, educating them
about whether they have a malpractice case or a simple fee dispute. The
court rules governing arbitral fee committees could specify that, because
malpractice is often intertwined with fee disputes, a client must first go
though a screening interview. During the interview, the screener could
determine if the client is likely to have a future malpractice claim. For
example, if the client's fee dispute centered mainly around a
misunderstanding about the basis for the fee and did not center on any
malpractice issues, the client might be sent on to fee arbitration. If,
however, the client talked about issues which might involve violations of an
RPC, such as billing fraud, the client would be educated about how fee
arbitration might affect his remedies for malpractice. Making it harder for
fee committees to exercise jurisdiction over a fee dispute in the first place is
one way to prevent clients from abusing the privilege of arbitration in order
to get "two bites at the apple."
Educating the client about the relationship between malpractice actions
and fee disputes would need to be delicately handled in order to avoid the
attorney's objection that the client is being pushed into filing a malpractice
action. Most attorneys would probably prefer that the client possibly get
"two bites at the apple" rather than having an arbitration screener educate
them about malpractice! Despite attorneys' nervousness, educating the client
means simply explaining the elements of malpractice in comparison to those
of a fee dispute and the consequences of filing one or both. The client could
evaluate his situation before initiating a fee dispute arbitration before a
committee whose jurisdiction is very limited. This would avoid wasting
judicial and arbitral resources and would give the legal community another
chance to be of service to a disgruntled client.
Wendi C. Reed
the client is prohibited from withdrawing from fee arbitration once it is docketed. See NJ. R.
CT. 1:20A-3(b)(1). According to the court, this restriction was designed to prevent clients
from filing a claim for the sole purpose of delaying payment of the attorney, thereby causing
the Fee Committee's volunteer members to waste time preparing for a case that is never
heard. See Saffer, 670 A.2d at 531.

